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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Accidents are the fourth leadinq cause of death in 
the United States, following heart disease, cancer, and 
stroke (National Safety Council, 1984). Occupational 
accidents have been decreasing over the years, but 
currently they are still a significant concern of 
industry. A 1984 census report (National Safety Council, 
1985) stated that accidental deaths in the United States 
related to work totalled 1,900,000. For 1983, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
estimates that 5.4 work-related deaths occurred per 
100,000 United States employees. According to the 
aforementioned census, United States accidents cost 
industry $33.4 billion in 1984 (36% of the total national 
accident cost) due to wage loss, medical expenses, 
insurance administration costs, fire loss, and indirect 
costs arising out of the work accidents. 
Industrial occupations such as mininq, steel and 
machinery manufacturing, railroading, etc., have systemic 
control systems run by safety committees, engineers, and 
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technological experts that focus on the physical hazards 
in the work environment. These systems operate in 
conjunction with federal, state, local, industrial, and 
OSHA regulations and standards (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 
1983). A large percentage of occupational accidents are 
the result of human error rather than environmental 
hazard. Systemic control systems are not as effective as 
they could be since they do not deal with the human error 
component of accidents. 
Considering the large percentage of accidents caused 
by human error, it is surprising to find that research on 
the psychosocial variables contributing to occupational 
accidents has been somewhat neglected. If the variables 
that contribute to human error are determined, a means of 
predicting human error and hence accidents can be 
established. This study will provide an organized 
descriptive theory of the psychosocial risk factors that 
lead to occupational accidents. 
The study will have practical value as well in 
diagnosing safety problems and thus aiding in the 
development of control procedures to reduce losses. 
Management and the work force of industry can benefit 
immensely by the saving of lives and money and the 
lessening of human injuries. Once the significant 
contributors to accidents are established for several 
industries, future research can attempt to generalize the 
3 
results to other industries. In the very long run, 
research can attempt to apply this knowledge to accidents 
in non-occupational settings such as traffic, the home, 
and public situations. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into 
four chapters. Chapt~r II is a synthesis of the relevant 
literature in the area of psychosocial variables in 
occupational accidents. A discussion of the existing 
research on the relationship of physical hazards, 
demographics, safety management, stress and anxiety, and 
perceived control to accidents is included. The chapter 
concludes with the proposal of an integrative model of 
the variables leading to accidents. 
Chapter III describes the methodology used in the 
study to test the proposed model. The aspects of the 
methodology included in this chapter are: independent 
and dependent variables investigated, respondents used, 
instrument used, procedure followed, and analysis 
conducted. 
Chapter IV reports the findings of the statistical 
analyses used in the study. Results of the factor 
analysis, reliability analysis, correlations between 
survey variables, correlations between survey variables 
and accidents, path analysis, overall regressions, and 
cross-validations are included in this report. 
The final chapter begins with a discussion of the 
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findings, their support of the model, and their 
theoretical relevance. The limitations of the study are 
discussed subsequently. The chapter concludes with 
sections on the practical implications of the study and 
suggestions for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter concentrates on a review of the 
literature of the psychosocial variables related to 
occupational accidents. The variables are categorized in 
five major sections: physical hazards and danger level, 
demographics, safety management, stress and anxiety, and 
perceived control. The chapter ends with an elaboration 
of a proposed path model which describes how each 
variable relates to occupational accidents. 
Several relevant books on the subject of 
psychosocial variables related to accidents were located 
through the card catalog. computer searches were 
conducted through Psychological Abstracts, Social Science 
Contents, Social Science Abstracts, Index Medicus, 
Engineering Contents, and National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Reports with the 
following terms: occupational accidents, injuries, and 
deaths with stress, anxiety, manufacturing, safety , and 
health. Investigation of this literature revealed a 
hodgepodge of studies focusing on only one or two 
5 
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variables and no studies were found which attempted to 
integrate findings from the various disciplines into an 
integrative theory. Combining the variables from each of 
the studies resulted in a list of predictive variables. 
These variables fell into five general categories and are 
detailed in the following sections. 
Physical Hazards/Danger Level 
A rather obvious finding is that physical hazards 
(e.g., falling rock, fires, broken tools, etc.) 
contribute to the accident rate. Human error alone is 
not enough to cause an accident. There must be some 
physical hazard present for an injury to occur. The 
degree to which physical hazards contribute to accidents 
depends, of course, on the severity of these hazards. 
Blignaut (1979) reports that in examining accident 
records of a South African mine, 40% of the accidents 
were caused by pure physical hazard, particularly falling 
rock. Sixty percent of these accidents, however, were 
caused primarily by human error, specifically inaccurate 
hazard perception. In these cases, the accident could 
have been avoided if the miner had perceived a warning 
and took corrective action. Lawrence (1974) also found 
that 60% of gold mining accidents were due to human error 
(e.g., missing a warning, forgetting a safety rule) and 
40% were caused by pure physical hazard which the miner 
could not avoid. 
7 
Other hazardous occupations, such as primary steel 
manufacturing (processing iron ore to steel) and airline 
piloting have fewer physical hazards to deal with and 
thus more of their accidents are primarily caused by 
human error. Mccarron and Haakenson (1979) in their 
study of airline piloting, report that accidents are 
caused by human error in 80% of the cases; 20% are caused 
by pure physical hazards. The same percentages have been 
reported for primary steel manufacturers (Guastello, 
Ikeda, & Connors, 1985). 
In summary, accidents are due largely to human error 
but a certain amount of hazard is necessary for an 
accident to occur. A measure of hazard is essential for 
any complete model of the accident process. 
Demographics 
Another rather obvious finding is that the major 
white-collar occupational groups generally have lower 
work-injury rates than their blue-collar counterparts, 
according to information from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (National Safety Council, 1982). Using 1978 
data from 25 states, the Bureau found that blue-collar 
workers comprised 48% of the employment population yet 
accounted for 77% of injuries compared to white-collar 
workers who made up 30% of the employment population yet 
only 8% of work injuries. This phenomenon is largely due 
to the fact that a greater degree of physical hazard 
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exists in blue-collar jobs than in white-collar jobs. 
Jsize of the work group an individual belongs to has 
been shown to relate to accidents. In a review article, 
Revans (1958) reported three studies which found a 
negative relationship, two a curvilinear relationship, 
and one a positive relationship between group size and 
accident rate. Conway et al. (1981) reported that 
accidents decrease as age, years of experience doing 
similar work, and seniority with the company increase. 
Females are reporte~ to have fewer accidents than males. 
Safety Management 
Several attributes of safety program management have 
been found to discriminate between manufacturing 
organizations with high versus low accident rates (Smith, 
Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978; Zohar, 1980). The list 
includes: perceived importance of safety training, 
status of the safety officer, status of safety committee, 
reward and punishment structure for safe and unsafe 
conduct, availability and use of protective safety 
equipment, and housekeeping behavior. Also, it is 
important to have appropriate role models of safety for 
employees to observe, a general climate that endorses 
safety, and a reinforcement program for appropriate 
safety behavior. 
Rather than simply presenting a group of tips for 
safety managers, Zohar (1980) emphasized the idea of a 
9 
climate for safety, where climate for safety can be 
thought of as a special case of organizational climate. 
The concept is not unfounded since earlier research on 
many subgroups found that accidents, absenteeism, 
turnover, job satisfaction and climate variables all vary 
together across organizational subgroups (Knowles, 1975). 
One purpose of the present research is to expand the 
climate concept beyond safety management issues only, to 
include other objective (i.e., physical hazard) and 
affective (i.e., stress, anxiety, and J~cus of control) 
concepts as well. 
Controlling the pace at which employees need to work 
to keep up with production quotas is another important 
characteristic of a good safety management program. 
Chiles (1982) found that job overload, which causes 
employees to work under time pressures, results in 
errors. Effectively managing task pace should reduce 
errors, thus decreasing the accident rate. 
stress and Anxiety · 
Stressors may be organized into two categories: 
those that are physical in origin, and those that are 
social in origin. 
Physical Stress. The relationship of physical 
stressors (such as heat, cold, noise, toxins, dust, lack 
of light, and crowdedness) to errors has been widely 
researched (Cohen, 1980) and shown to negatively affect 
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performance on certain tasks. Excess noise has been 
shown to inhibit task performance (Glass & Singer, 1972; 
Zimmer & Brachulis, 1978) as well as increase accident 
rates (Noweir, 1984; Wilkins & Action, 1982). 
Performance on both physical and mental tasks has been 
reported to be adversely affected by excessive heat 
(Hancock, 1980) and prolonged exposure to cold 
temperatures (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 1983). 
Shiftwork has also been shown to be related to 
performance. The basic concept behind shiftwork research 
is that shiftwork (i.e., any work other than the regular 
6:00 a.m.- 2:00 p.m., 7:00 a.m.- 3:00 p.m., s:oo a.m.-
4.p.m., or 9:00 a.m.- 5:00 p.m hours, involving a second 
shift, night shift, or rotating shifts) has a deleterious 
effect on most people's performance (Guastello, 1982). 
The unwanted effects on performance and well being have 
been attributed to disturbance of circadian rhythms and 
normal sleep patterns (Bell & Telman, 198Q; Borowsky & 
Wall, 1983; Ribak et al., 1983). 
Social Stress. It has been demonstrated that 
personal and social stressors predict physical illness. 
Holmes and Rahe (1967) have developed a Life Events Scale 
which includes a checklist of stressful events such as 
the death of a relative, a divorce, etc. An overall 
score is obtained for any individual by adding the 
specific stress values assigned to each individual item. 
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Research has demonstrated that those individuals 
receiving high scores are more likely to suffer an 
illness in the next two years than those individuals 
receiving low scores. Levenson (1983) found through 
post-accident interviews that those employees who had 
accidents had been experiencing more life stressors 
before the accident than those employees not involved in 
accidents. 
Fairly recent studies have shown that stressful 
events may immediately precede automobile and domestic 
accidents as well as industrial accidents (Whitlock, 
Stoll , & Rekhdahl, 1977). Brenner and Selzer (1969) 
found that automobile drivers who experienced recent 
social stress were five times more likely to cause fatal 
accidents as drivers without such stress. 
Anxiety. Manifest anxiety as measured by the Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953) is often indicative of 
stress in a person's life -- either physical or social 
stress. The anxiety scale which was derived from the 
Minnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory (MMPI) is a collection 
of medical symptoms which do not go together logically. 
These symptoms could be precipitated by stressful events 
or they could be a neurotic disorder independent of any 
stressful events. Persons experiencing many life 
stressors and/or physical stressors but exhibiting little 
anxiety may be "resistant to stress" (Zarzycka, 1982), a 
12 
trait found to be a predictor of low accident rates. 
Some associations have been made between anxiety and 
accident rates.. Casualities in one automobile plant had 
longer past histories of medical, surgical, and 
psychiatric episodes (Allodi & Montgomery, 1979). 
Hirschfeld and Behan (1963), in reviewing 300 cases of 
industrial accidents leading to disability, emphasized 
that accidents are part of a process in which both stress 
and anxiety dominate the pre-accident setting, slow down 
rec~very, and prolong disability. Japanese pilots who 
were accident victims were found to be experiencing many 
anxiety symptoms preceding the incident (Kakimoto, Katoh, 
Nakabayashi, & Iwamoto, 1983). 
The previously mentioned studies that examined 
stress and anxiety levels before an accident are suspect 
with regard to validity since subjects were studied after 
an accident in order to determine their stress and 
anxiety levels before the accident. One cannot help but 
wonder about the accuracy of this recall method. 
Perceived Control 
It has been established that uncontrollable physical 
stressors such as noise, heat, and cr.owding lead to 
/ (_greater error than controllable ones (Glass & Singer, 
1972). For example, if a person has the option of 
turning down the heat, that person will experience less 
stress (regardless of whether he or she actually turns 
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the heat down) than the person who has no option other 
than bearing it (Cohen, 1980). Three theories have been 
proposed to explain this phenomenon and they are 
described as follows. 
Adaptive-cost Hypothesis. According to the 
adaptive-cost hypothesis (Glass & Singer, 1972), the work 
required to adapt to unpredictable and uncontrollable 
stressors is substantially greater than that required to 
adapt to predictable and controllable stimulation. The 
theory predicts that p~~rer performance on aftereffects 
tasks should vary directly with the degree of adaptation, 
since a greater degree of adaptation implies a greater 
amount of adaptive effort. Presumably, increased 
adaptive effort would deplete one's available psychic 
energies and would thus result in deficits on subsequent 
demanding tasks. 
Information Overload Hypothesis. An alternative 
form of a psychic cost hypothesis, the information 
overload hypothesis, has been proposed by Cohen (1978). 
He argued that unpredictable, uncontrollable stressors, 
because they are potentially threatening, substantially 
increase demands on attentional capacity. This increased 
demand might occur because individuals are required to 
monitor threatening stimuli to decide how to respond, or 
because effort is required to tune out distracting 
stimuli. Prolonged exposure to an environmental stressor 
14 
and/or to a high information load should result in 
cognitive fatigue -- an insufficient reserve of attention 
to perform demanding tasks. 
Learned Helplessness Theory. Learned helplessness 
theory was proposed by Seligman (1975) to explain the 
locus of control concept. He argued that subjects who 
are unable to predict and control a stressor learn that 
their reinforcements are independent of their responses, 
which results in motivational decrements that are 
manifested in poorer performance. In other words, 
individuals submit to negative consequences because their 
experiences have demonstrated that any action to avoid 
them is futile. 
Locus of Control. The personality trait of locus of 
control (Rotter, 1966) involves the degree to which 
individuals perceive that they have control over events 
occurring in their lives. According to the theory, an 
individual with an external locus of control perceives 
that circumstances, bad or good luck, other people, or 
events are responsible for what occurs in life while an 
individual with an internal locus of control perceives 
that individuals are the makers of their own destinies 
and responsible for their own fortunes or misfortunes • 
.. Internality increases with age, and women in general are 
more externally oriented according to the research 
(Lefcourt, 1981). 
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Locus of control has been shown to be a moderator of 
stressful life events, life events having a more severe 
impact on externals (Lefcourt, 1981). Internals seem to 
demonstrate a resistance to stress, the trait found by 
zaraycka (1982) to be a predictor of accidents. ~ 
Internals are also reported to be more resistant to ~­
illness and there is a consistent and statistically 
significant finding that externals report more anxiety 
than internals. The impact of locus of control on 
stressful occupational events is illustrated by a study 
of manager's behavior after a flood (Anderson, 1977). 
Internally oriented managers responded in a more 
task-oriented way, demonstrating less stre'ss while 
externals responded with anger, anxiety, and hostility. 
Since stress and anxiety have been reported to 
contribute to error and accidents, and locus of control 
has been shown to moderate stress and anxiety, it follows 
that locus of control is an important variable in errors 
and accidents. Only one study was found which focussed 
on this relationship directly, finding no significant 
difference in Rotter's locus of control scores between 
two work groups with differing accident rates (Sims, 
Graves, & Simpson, 1984). However, the volunteer miners 
used as subjects in this study were reported to be 
significantly higher on internal locus of control 
measures than a comparison sample of university students. 
16 
stress and other related variables were not examined in 
this study. Since predictability and controllability 
have been shown to be important aspects of physical 
stressors and their relationship to error, it is likely 
that locus of control will prove to be an important 
moderator variable in the relationship of social stress 
to error. 
Proposed Model 
The variables discussed in the previous section can 
be combined to develop a model of the psychosocial 
variables related to occupational accidents. This 
section includes a discussion of the direct and indirect 
relationships proposed between safety management, 
experience, danger level, physical hazards and stressors, 
life stress, locus.of control, and anxiety with 
occupational accidents. 
The theoretical model presented in Figure 1 
illustrates the proposed relationship between the 
aforementioned variables. The model combines the 
findings from the literature into an integrative theory. 
Research supports the propositions that physical hazards, 
danger level, experience, safety management, and anxiety 
affect accidents directly. This study will attempt to 
validate these findings. 
Research also supports the proposition that stress, 
anxiety, and locus of control are interrelated: Stress 
SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
DANGER LEVEL 
PHYSICAL HAZARDS 
/ 
PHYSICAL STRESS 
LIFE STRESS 
LOCUS OF 
CONTROL 
EXPERIENCE 
ACCIDENT 
RATES 
Figure !• Proposed model of the variables related to accidents. 
....... 
.....] 
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leads to anxiety and locus of control moderates the 
amount of anxiety a person may feel in response to this 
stress. Stress and locus of control, then, are proposed 
to relate to accidents only through their effect on 
anxiety. 
Studies on social stress and anxiety as they relate 
to accidents are all post-dictive in nature. The 
procedure in these studies was to interview individuals 
who were involved in accidents to determine their stress 
and anxiety levels before the accident occurred. This 
study, however, will measure group levels of social 
stress, anxiety and accidents concurrently in order to 
develop an equation relating these variables to 
accidents. 
Perceived uncontrollability of physical stressors 
has been shown to affect performance adversely. As 
suggested in the adaptive-cost hypothesis (Glass & 
Singer, 1972), perhaps an individual's energy is drained 
due to the greater adaptive effort necessary to maintain 
the same performance level and so safety precautions 
suffer. As explained by the information overload 
hypothesis (Cohen, 1980), perhaps an individual's channel 
capacity becomes overloaded and secondary tasks such as 
safety precautions suffer as a result of this overload. 
Lastly, perhaps individuals learn that their 
reinforcements are independent of their efforts and the 
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motivation to attend to safety is diminished as suggested 
by learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1975). This 
study will investigate the effect of uncontrollable 
physical stressors on accidents. It is proposed that 
physical and life stressors will affect accidents 
indirectly by increasing anxiety. 
Only one study has examined the direct relationship 
between accidents and locus of control. The literature 
supports the hypothesis that locus of control moderates 
the impact of stressful life events and physical 
stressors on individuals. Since anxiety leads to 
accidents, the hypothesis that locus of control leads to 
accidents through its effect on anxiety (i.e., by 
moderating stress) will also be tested in this study. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
This chapter on methodology begins with a discussion 
of the independent and dependent variables investigated 
in the study. Descriptions of the subjects and 
instruments used in the study are given next. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the procedure 
followed and analyses performed in the study. 
Variables to be Investigated 
Data was collected by a survey on the following 
independent variables: experience, safety management, 
physical hazards, danger level, physical stressors, 
social stressors, anxiety, and locus of control. 
The dependent measure, group accident rates (number 
of accidents per 100 man years) during January 1984 to 
October 1985, was obtained from company accident reports 
and validated by rates listed on the OSHA-200 forms. A 
company accident report describing the incident and the 
apparent causes is completed each time an accident 
occurs. Monthly, information regarding types and number 
of accidents is compiled onto the OSHA-200 form which is 
20 
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required by OSHA to keep record of each company's 
accident history. Accident rates on these forms were 
calculated according to Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration policy. An accident is defined as 
"something that is unplanned, uncontrolled, and in some 
way undesirable; it disrupts the normal functions of a 
person or persons and causes injury, death, or near 
injury" (Anton, 1979). Only those accidents caused at 
least in part by human error are of interest in this 
study since psychology is the focus of this research. It 
was found that all the accidents reported had some 
component of human error. 
Any errors in the reporting of accidents would of 
course decrease the reliability of the dependent variable 
thus affecting the statistical conclusion validity of the 
study. Since the reporting of accidents is an 
established practice for the company and since accident 
rates are obtained from two sources, the amount of error 
in reporting should be small. 
In this study, two different measures of accident 
rates were collected: (1) accident rate per 100 man 
years for 1985 only and (2) accident rate per 100 man 
years for 1984 and 1985 combined. This system of 
accident reporting is used by OSHA. Both measurements of 
the dependent variable were used in order to obtain a 
subjective assessment of over how long a period of time 
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accident data needs to be collected in order to achieve 
reliable indicators. Cohen and Cohen (1975) suggest that 
rate data undergo log transformation before multiple 
regressions are conducted upon it. The log 
transformation of rate data (which is non-linear) 
linearizes the relationship between the independent 
variables and accident rate thus capitalizing on the 
analytic power of multiple regression. Regular accident 
rates and log of acccident rates were used in the study 
for this reason. 
There were a total of four versions of the dependent 
variable: accident rate for 1985, accident rate for 1984 
and 1985 combined, base-10 logarithm of the accident rate 
for 1985 , and base-10 logarithm of the accident rate for 
1984 and 1985 combined. Correlations between independent 
variables and accidents were calculated using each of the 
four versions of the dependent variable. This was done 
to determine whether or not log transformation would 
enhance results, and whether data obtained over the most 
recent six months or most recent one year period would be 
a better predictor of accident rates. It was found that 
the log transformation greatly enhanced the predicted 
relationships and that data collected during both the six 
month and one year period provided useful information. 
For these reasons, log of 1985 and log of 1984-1985 
combined were used as dependent measures in all 
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subsequent analyses. 
Data on work group size was retrieved from company 
records to further investigate the correlation between 
group size and accidents since studies on this topic are 
inconclusive. 
Subjects 
Subjects were the employees of nine small 
manufacturing companies: one Chicago area steel sheet 
metal company, one Chicago area brass sheet metal 
company, four Milwaukee area steel foundries, one 
Milwaukee area brass foundry, one Rhode Island brass 
sheet metal company, and one Racine aluminum and alloy 
foundry. 
overall, the return rate was 52%. Return rates of 
each company along with the number of work groups and 
total number of workers in each company are listed in 
Table 1. A broad range of response rates was found among 
the companies (30% to 82%). Analyses of the effect of 
response rate on the independent and dependent variables 
revealed no significant effect. Response rate was not 
correlated with any of the variables used in the study. 
However, the effect of a possible response bias 
(nonrespondents differing from respondents) is 
investigated in the discussion. 
Job categories in the sample industries included 
electrical and mechanical maintenance, trucking, 
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Table l 
Summary of Company Response Rates 
Type !ll_ Company #Groups Subunit Size #Returned Percent 
brass mill 3 22 11 50 
brass mill 10 62 47 76 
steel mill 12 90 74 82 
steel foundry 9 125 51 41 
steel foundry 11 167 109 65 
steel foundry 7 62 22 36 
steel foundry 9 146 53 36 
brass foundry 9 84 42 50 
aluminum foundry 9 86 26 30 
Overall 79 854 335 52 
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clerical, supervisory, operator, and general laborer. 
The following two job definitions are included to 
illustrate typical job duties of foundry and sheet metal 
operators and laborers. 
The foundry worker (United states Department of 
Labor, 1965) performs any combination of the following 
tasks: melting metal, pouring metal into molds, removing 
castings from molds, dressing castings, moving foundry 
materials, and cleaning equipment and work areas. The 
foundry worker moves sand, castings, flasks or other 
materials about the foundry by hand, using a wheel-barrow 
or cart, or by loading them onto a conveyor. Other 
duties include watering and mixing sand, shoveling sand 
into flasks, and compacting sand in flasks using a 
ramming tool. The foundry job involves spraying binder 
on the surface of sand molds and drying the surface with 
a blowtorch. 
A slitting-machine operator (United States 
Department of Labor, 1965) is one type of operator in the 
sheet metal companies. This type of operator sets up and 
operates a slitting machine to cut sheet metal into 
strips of specified width. They select, clean, and 
install spacers and cutters on arbors, and hone cutters 
with oilstone to remove nicks. Other duties include: 
pressing buttons to lower the arbor until cutters mesh, 
measuring clearance with a feeler gage, inserting spacers 
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to adjust spacing to specified tolerance, threading 
sheets through slitters and verifying dimensions of cut 
to specifications using a rule. 
A range of risk was sampled. Both companies as a 
whole and work groups within companies varied in their 
accident rates so there was not a problem with inhibited 
correlations due to restriction of range of accident 
rates. For the years of 1984 and 1985 combined, overall 
company accident rates ranged from 84.5 accidents per 100 
man years to 511.8. Across all companies, work groups 
ranged from a rate of o.o accidents per 100 man years to 
125.0. There were a total of 79 work groups and 435 
employees in the sample. The majority of these subjects 
were blue collar male, however, 12.2% of the sample were 
females. 
Instrument 
The Employee Assessment of Occupational Hazards 
survey (Guastella, 1984) was used in this study. The 
survey contained 75 items and took about 25 minutes to 
complete. Questions 1, 3, and 4, asked about experience: 
age, years with the company, and years doing similar 
work. Responses were scaled from 3 to 12 with larger 
values indicating an older, more experienced person. 
Information obtained from items 2, 4, and 5 was used for 
descriptive purposes only. These items concerned: sex, 
work area, and job category. The rest of the survey was 
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arranged into three major sections: safety, health, and 
hazard checklist. Response mode for the safety and 
health questions was kept simple -- agree, do not know, 
and disagree. To respond to the hazard checklist, the 
individual merely checked off yes or no depending on if 
the hazard existed or not. 
Safety items included questions on safety management 
and locus of control. 
Safety Management Questions. Safety management 
questions were as follows: 
7. The company safety program really does control 
accidents. 
a. New employees are not properly trained for 
safety in the work place. 
9. The company is concerned with safety in the 
work place. 
10. My co-workers often fail to observe safe 
procedures in the work place. 
11. The place I must work in is usually orderly 
and tidy. 
12. In the place I work, there are usually things 
all over the floor that people can trip on or 
hurt themselves on. 
13. The company gives us all the safety equipment 
we need to protect ourselves on the job. 
14-. There are no safety procedures for some of 
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the hazards we must work with. 
15. People who follow safe procedures are 
promoted more often than those who do not. 
20. When someone is performing a job unsafely, 
the foreman shows that person how to do the 
job properly. 
21. The foreman usually does not notice when 
someone is performing a job unsafely. 
22. Management requires severe penalties for 
persons who do not follow safe procedures. 
23. Some of this company's safety rules are 
foolish. 
24. People who always follow safety rules are 
just scared to work here. 
25. It is not possible to follow all the 
safety rules if you want to keep up with 
production. 
Items 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20, and 22 were scored as 
follows: agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O. The 
"agree" response for these items was favorable to company 
management, "I don't know" was neither favorable nor 
unfavorable, and "disagree" was unfavorable. Items 8, 
10, 12, 14, 21, 23, 24, and 25 were scored as follows: 
agree=O, I don't know=l, and disagree=O. For these 
items, the "agree" response was unfavorable to company 
management, "I don't know" was again neither favorable 
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nor unfavorable, and "disagree" was favorable. The 
subscale was scored 0-30 where larger values indicated 
the relative adequacy of the companies' policies and 
procedures. These items were modeled after factors found 
to discriminate between high and low risk groups in 
studies of Zohar {1980) and Smith et al.(1978). 
Locus of Control Questions. The other safety items, 
locus of control, were as follows: 
26. Accidents are caused by mistakes people make. 
27. Sometimes accidents just happen, and there is 
nothing that can be done about it. 
28. Trusting in luck does not work to improve 
safety. 
29. "Near-miss" accidents are not important, only 
the ones that actually happened. 
30. I do not have much control over whether the 
people I work with follow safe procedures. 
31. I feel I have been lucky with regard to 
accidents. 
32. I feel I can always keep myself out of an 
accident. 
33. Accidents have nothing to do with luck. 
The responses for items 26, 28, 32, and 33 were 
coded in the following manner: agree=O, I don't know=l, 
and disagree=2. Internal locus of control individuals 
were expected to answer "agree" to these items more 
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often, while external locus of control individuals were 
expected to answer "disagree." Items 27, 29, 30, and 31 
were reverse scored so that internally controlled 
respondents would tend to disagree while externally 
controlled respondents would tend to agree. The subscale 
was scored 0-16 where resulting scores represented the 
degree to which the employee was externally controlled 
with respect to accidents. After conducting a 
reiiability analysis of this scale, item 26 was 
elimin~.ted from the scale (see Results). The range of 
scores was reduced from 0-16 to 0-14 as a result of this 
procedure. 
It should be mentioned that prior to including this 
scale in the survey, a pilot test was conducted on the 
scale using a sample of 184 students from a Midwestern 
University (Guastello & Guastello, in press) • This locus 
of control scale was found to be significantly correlated 
with the Rotter locus of control scale (~.13, R<.05). 
However, this is less than 2% of shared variance. 
Nevertheless, the scale was included due to the need for 
a short scale with face validity (see Procedure) • The 
implications of this low correlation for the locus of 
control construct are elaborated upon in the discussion. 
Health questions consisted of: (1) anxiety 
questions from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (1953); 
and (2) the life stress checklist from the Holmes and 
Rahe (1967) scale. 
Anxiety Questions. Anxiety questions were as 
follows: 
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36. I am extremely tired when I get home from 
work every day. 
37. I am often sick to my stomach. 
38. I am more nervous than other people I work 
with. 
39. I have at least one bad headache a week. 
40. I work under B great deal of tension. 
41. I can feel my hands, arms, or legs shaking 
when I work. 
42. I have nightmares about my job. 
43. I do not sweat more than other people. 
44. Most people are more afraid of the job 
hazards than I am. 
45. I am often hungry between meals. 
46. I do not have problems with diarrhea or 
constipation. 
47. I am very sure of myself in new situations. 
Items 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 45 were scored 
as follows: agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O. 
Higher anxiety individuals were expected to agree with 
most of these items. Higher anxiety respondents were 
expected to disagree with items 43, 44, 46, and 47 which 
were reverse scored. The subscale was scored 0-22 .. 
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Higher values indicated higher anxiety. After 
reliability analyses were conducted, items 44 and 47 were 
eliminated from the scale (details in Results). Scoring 
changed from 0-22 to 0-18 as a result of this procedure. 
Life Stress Checklist. Also included in the health 
area of the survey was the life stress checklist which 
included the following items: 
48. My wife/husband has died within the 
last six months. 
49. A close family member (not husband or wife) 
has died within the last six months. 
50. A close friend has died within the last 
six months. 
51. I am in the process of obtaining a divorce. 
52. I feel my job security has improved in the 
last six months. 
53. I have been given new job assignments 
in the last six months. 
54. I am now making plans for retirement. 
55. My working hours have changed recently. 
56. Lately I have been sleeping less or 
at different hours. 
57. I have been eating less regularly lately. 
58. Someone in my family has suffered a major 
illness or injury. 
Although the "I don't know" responses were not 
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expected for items 48-51, the option was retained so that 
the response format would be consistent.throughout the 
scale. The following coding scheme was used for all 
items in the scale: agree=2, I don't know=l, and 
disagree=O. Resulting scores ranged from 0-22 where 
larger values indicated the presence of more stressful 
life events than smaller values. 
Questions about the working environment included 
questions about the danger level of the environment and a 
phy~ical stressor and physical hazard checklist. 
Danger Level. Questions used to determine the level 
of danger in the plant were as follows: 
16. There are no real hazards in my work area. 
17. People in my work place are often injured 
enough to need help from the clinic. 
18. Accidents in my work place sometimes put 
people out of work for a long time. 
19. People in my work place are sometimes 
killed on the job. 
34. There are no real health hazards in my 
work place. 
35. People in my work place are sometimes 
sick due to health hazards on the job. 
Responses to items 17, 18, 19, and 35 were coded as 
follows: agree=2, I don't know=l, and disagree=O. Items 
16, and 34 were reverse scored. The subscale scores 
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ranged from 0-12 where higher numbers indicated a more 
dangerous work environment than lower numbers. 
Stress and Hazard Checklist. The stressor and 
hazard checklists were derived from actual hazard reports 
of various manufacturing companies. The response format 
for both checklists was yes/no. "Yes" was coded as 1 and 
"No" was coded as o. The physical stressors checklist 
contained these items: crowding with other people (item 
60), work place too hot (item 64), work place too cold 
(item 65), too much dust (item 66), toxic fumes (item 
67), not enough light (item 71), intense noise (item 72), 
and on an irregular shift (item 75). 
The J:'esponse choice of "shift you are working" 
varied with each company because companies had different 
ways of dividing up the work day. In any case, if an 
individual worked the first shift he or she was assigned 
a 1 and if he or she worked any other shift (including 
rotating shift), he or she was assigned a O code. This 
code was· then added to the physical stress score. Items 
were scored o-a where higher numbers meant that more 
stressors were present. 
The physical hazard checklist consisted of the 
following items: walkways crowded with equipment (item 
59), broken tools (item 61), trash in work space (item 
62), missing safety devices (item 63), equipment not 
properly stored (item 68), open fires (item 69), 
35 
explosions (item 70), sometimes cannot hear warning 
signals (item 73), and people who do not work here 
walking through dangerous places (item 74). Items were 
scored from 0-9 where higher numbers meant that more 
hazards were present in the work environment. 
Procedure 
The survey method was chosen because of its 
suitability for the purposes of the study. The survey 
was administered on company time because this was the 
easiest way to contact subjects and it helped to achieve 
a response rate greater than one that would be achieved 
by mail. The companies had only two conditions for 
administering the survey on company time. First of all, 
the length of the administration time could be only about 
1/2 hour. Secondly, the survey had to have face 
validity. Safety directors wanted to see that the 
questions were related to accidents. Safety managers 
were not favorable to experimental designs due to the 
time experiments take and due to their lack of face 
validity (as perceived by non-researchers). 
The surveying began in August. The safety manager 
of each company was responsible for administering the 
survey to their employees. The surveys were accompanied 
by a cover letter from the experimenter although there 
was phone communication prior to this. The cover letter 
covered the following key points: 
1. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this 
research project. 
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2. The goals of the project are to study psychological 
variables that can greatly influence accident rates 
and in this way to aid in the development of new 
control strategies. You will of course receive a 
copy of all reports resulting from this research. 
3. No individual data can or will be exposed. There 
will be no ranking or rating of individuals since 
this would be against union contract. 
4. Employee participation is voluntary but strongly 
encouraged. 
5. Please instruct one employee in each work group to 
collect surveys (folded over and stapled) and to 
return them to the safety director who will mail them 
to the researcher. 
The safety director of each company was requested to 
include copies of accident reports, OSHA-200 forms, and 
work group sizes when returning the surveys. All data 
was returned by October. 
Analyses 
Factor Analysis. A factor analysis was performed 
using individual level data to determine the factor 
37 
structure of the survey. cronbach's alpha was calculated 
to determine the reliability of each of the factors. For 
these analyses, n=435. Eight factors as described under 
the instrument section were expected (i.e., locus of 
control, danger level, life stressors, physical 
stressors, anxiety, safety management, physical hazards, 
and experience). 
Path Analysis. Path analysis was the most 
appropriate statistical technique for analyzing the data 
in an attempt to validate the proposed model (Pedhazur, 
1982). It was important to use group accident rates as 
the dependent variable since a person' s involvement in 
an accident did not necessarily mean that the person 
caused the accident. Since group accident rates were 
used, group means on the independent variables proposed 
to directly relate to accident rate also had to be used 
so that the levels of analyses were comparable. 
The path analysis produced a path coefficient for 
each proposed relationship between variables in the 
model. The analysis was basically comprised of two 
multiple regressions. The first used group level data to 
predict accident rates from safety management, physical 
hazards, danger level, experience, and anxiety. The 
second used individual level data to predict anxiety from 
locus of control, physical stressors, and social 
stressors. Individual level data was more appropriate 
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for variables such as anxiety, locus of control, and life 
stress since differences in these variables were all 
measured at the individual level. Also, using individual 
level data when possible, increased n from 79 to 435. 
An overall multiple regression was also conducted 
(using group level data for all eight variables) to 
determine how each factor directly related to ·accidents. 
The coefficient of determination, B2, obtained from this 
regression indicated the proportion of variance in 
accident rates accounted for by the entire combination of 
psychosocial variables. 
A cross-validation (Cohen & Cohen, 1975) was 
performed on the path analysis regression equations. 
After analyses on the intact sample was completed, the 
sample was divided into 2/3 and 1/3 parts. The analyses 
were then repeated on the larger part to obtain 
regression weights. These weights were then applied to 
the smaller partial sample to obtain predicted values of 
the dependent variables to correlate with the actual 
values of the dependent variables. These correlations 
provided a measure of the accuracy of the original 
weights. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter is a report of the results of the 
analyses performed on the data obtained in the study. 
The findings are discusser! in the following order: 
factor analysis, reliability analysis, correlations 
between survey variables, correlations of survey 
variables with accidents, subunit size, path analysis, 
overall regression, and cross-validation. 
Factor Analysis 
A factor analysis, using the principal axis method, 
was performed on the survey variables. The varimax 
rotation converged in 31 iterations and 11 factors with 
eigenvalues>.90 (see Table 2) were extracted. Loading 
criterion was set at 0.30. It was hypothesized that each 
of the eight scales on the survey would emerge as a 
distinct factor in the analysis. Results approximated 
this expectation. 
Factor 1, a messiness factor, was composed of four 
physical hazards items (items 59,61,62, and 63) and two 
safety management items (items 11, and 12). It appears 
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Table 2 
Factor Analysis of Survey Variable (Questions 1,3,4,7-75) 
FACTOR FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 
" 
FACTOR 5 
Ql -II . .0'4232 -11./14198 -B . .0'2351 • 74442 . .0'3436 
Q3 
-
. .046.0'3 . .0'1356 • .0'7963 .76968 -B . .07731 
Q.4 .B.0467 . .0'51182 .B/1148 .7.0/166 . .04344 
a7 -11.19512 -B . .05565 -B.11232 -B . .0'3.049 .45924 
as -B.11653 -B. 16185 -.0'./15641 -B./12.0'55 -B./12569 
a9 -B.21294 -B.137.0'2 -B.12754 -B . .0'3556 .63111 
au· -B.16286 -B./18886 -B • .0'2145 -B . .0'7314 .12684 
all -B.47.0'88 -B. 1.0792 -B • .0539.0' . .0'71.0'7 . 24327 
012 -B.54427 -B.l.0'479 -B.12957 -B.B.0'367 . 22.0'33 
Cl 3 - B. 1 4 4.09 -B.12.0'56 -B . .05725 . .0'3.0'6.0 .4719.0' 
au -B.18615 -.0'./18916 -B.12355 . .0'2343 .24982 
015 -.0" • .0'3.0'46 -B.1384.0' ./12272 -B . .0'1889 .12188 
Ql6 .1.4433 .115711 .113684 -B.113813 -B . .99295 
Q17 .167749 .24764 • .96631 ./1388:' -B. 111186 
Ql8 • .8'6858 • .8'6139 .164917 ./12987 -8./138114 Ql9 .JJ9929 -B.11535B .B1881 • .95613 .JJ284B 
02B -11.-283.07 -B.166.0'3 -16./11311 -.0' • .0'4591 .39728 
021 -B.25749 -B.18378 -B.Bl.089 -.0'.B7667 .19563 
022 -B.11484 -B .1.0.083 -B./131.08 • .0'.0'149 .3.0'491 
Q23 -B. 23655 -B • .0'5881 -.0' • .0'6.089 • .0176/I • 12377 
Q24 -B.18665 • .0392.0 -B.13368 -B • .0'5496 • 18724 
Q25 -B.17431 -B. 188.0'1 -B.2.0993 -B • .0'1345 .16666 
026 -B • .0457.0' -B.BB7B3 • .0'/1183 ./16371 .31964 
a27 ./16667 ./123/13 -B.117137 ./19137 • .03837 
Q28 -B • .0'2739 ./13594 ./11123 -.0' • .0'4328 • .0'2195 
029 -B. lB.0'28 . .0'9.0.0'2 -B • .03693 . .02532 .B.0'148 
03.0' -II. 183.0'6 -B.2.0883 .B.0'985 • .0'1977 .1787.0' Q31 .14827 • .0'7641 . .0'6456 .B2B78 .B.0'4.0'1 
Q32 -B . .0'1433 • .0'1655 -B.1.0.016 -B • .04164 .18967 
ll33 -B .B.0786 -B . .01753 -B . .02548 -B • .0'.0'831 -B . .0'1.0'38 
034 .11926 .22.072 .B8648 -B • .0'3541 -B • .07889 Q35 .26433 .17423 .2.0'.0'36 .11469 -.0' • .0'7134 Q36 • 1B52 l .26584 .52755 -11./13567 -B. 14625 
037 • /181516 .1B724 .58961 -B.B5432 -B • .09588 
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Table 2 
continued 
FACTOR 1 FACTOR z FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 
Q38 • .0'6 9 4.0' • .0'2983 .47358 • .9'1823 • .93997 
Q39 • .0'8848 • .0'2612 .54526 -.0' • .0'2419 -.0'. l.0'893 
Q4B .11561 • .0'5162 .54.0'58 .18396 -.0' • .0'4361 
Q41 •. 0'7685 .l.0'544 .38784 • .0'38.0'3 • .0'3369 
Q42 • .0'5136 • .0'9793 • 4 7.0'9 l -.0'.B2.0'.0'4 -.0' • .0'2633 
Q43 -B • .0'1252 -.0' • .0'.0'366 . .0'2248 -.0' • .0'4891 -.0' • .0'.0'433 
a.u • .0'3427 .1255.0' • 18482 • .0'.0'64.0' • .0'3973 
Q45 • .0'7/J27 .11147 .21798 -.0'.13739 -.0' • .0'3167 
Q46 -11 • .0'5.0'82 • l.0'153 • .0'7.0'94 • .0'337.0' • .0'.0'.0'98 
Q47 -B • .0'3155 -.0' . .0'2.0'62 • .0'38.0'5 -.0' • .0'3212 • .0'314.0' 
Q48 • .0'2569 -.0' • .0'1347 • .0'6869 • .0'8347 -.0' • .0'4955 
Q49 • .0'.0'4 71 -B • .0'.0'3.0'9 • .0'6562 • .0'2746 -.0' • .0'3285 
QS.0' • .0'9246 . .0'6172 • .0'5687 • .0'9.0'19 -.0' • .0'3261 
QSl • .0'4648 • .0'7118 • .0'1637 • .0'5988 -.0' • .0'2779 
052 -11.13834 -B .16355 -.0'.16464 -.0'.22522 .12424 
053 • .0'4363 • .0'1786 • .0'3644 -.0' • .0'826.0' • .0'1872 
Q54 • .0'.0'885 -.0' • .0'5191 -.0' • .0'3781 .29558 • .0'1411 
ass • .0'2535 .l.0'112 • .0'5299 • .0'.0'534 -.0' • .0'1.0'.0'4 
a56 • .0'6618 • .0'2371 .13.0'66 -.0'.l.0'349 • .0'2528 
Q57 • .0'9612 • .0'5126 .1632.0' -91. l.0'422 -.0'.91816.0' 
ass .14524 .11391 • .0'7537 -.0'.913789 -.0' • .0'158.0' 
Q59 • 6.0'539 .13.0'88 • 19254 • .0'5788 -.0' • ..0'3295 
Q6.0' .29.0'18 • .0'4975 .17.0'36 -..0' • ..0'3741 -.0' • .0'6762 
Q61 .43962 • 145.0'1 .11165 -.0' • .0'5165 -.0'.l.0'4.0'6 
a62 .59459 .23373 • l.0'817 • ..0'.0'729 -.0'. l.0'956 
Q63 .34888 .18374 • .0'5581 • .0'8663 -.0'.15517 
Q64 • 161.0'7 .58558 • ..0'9972 -B • .0'5868 -.0' • .0'9234 
Q65 .24642 • 466.0'8 .19565 • 16944 -B • .0'6795 
066, • 2.0'364 .56781 .13.0'16 .11271.0' -.0'.142.0'9 
a67 .2.0'679 • 35141 • 14553 • .9'9774 .-B.11916 
068 .45422 .168.0'2 . .0'4.0'64 -.0'. B.0'/J.0'9 -.0'.15427 
Q69 .11181 .29145 • .0'37218 -.0' • ..0'7.0'22 -.0' ./8599.0' 
0718 • .09674 • .0955.0' .JU6.0'.0' .918828 -.0' • .0'25.0'9 
Q71 .19874 .34486 • .0'8237 .182194 -91. 11282 
072 • .0'7933 .64.0'3..0' .0863/8 -91 • .0'3501 -0 • .0'0798 
073 • 191865 • 34 7.0'9 • .0'3158 .11.0'19 -B.19158 
074 .23342 . 2414.0'.0' .17613 .12792 -fl . .0'9622 
a75 .B3163 .BlB29 .B7BBB -11.15455 -B.B8466 
EIGENVALUE 8.86139 2. 38B65 Z.28558 1.72.0'22 1.47612 
PCT CF VAi\ 12.3 3.3 3.Z Z.4 2. l 
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Table 2 
continued 
FACTOR 6 FACTOR 7 FACTOR 8 FACTOR 9 FACTOR 1.0' FACTOR 1 1 
01 -B • .0'1978 • .0'6658 
-·. 172.8'5 • .0'6185 -.0'. l.0'26.0' -.0'./J.0'24.0' 
03 • .0'3284 • .0'15.8'1 • .0'2971 • .0'2141 -B • .03359 -B • .0'1219 
04 • .0'6572 • .0'5888 • .0'64.8'9 • .0'2 2 1.0' -.0' • .0'5496 -.0' • .0'57.0'6 
07 -B.1624.8' 
-· • .0'1348 -B • .0'4347 -B . .0'3.0'5/J • .0'4.0'74 -B • .0'4826 08 -B • .0'2575 • .0'6513 -B • .0'3747 -.0' • .0'616.0' -.0' .B.0'81.0' • .02282 
09 -11 • .0'.0'167 .138211 -B • .0'4363 -B • .0'3.0'36 -B • .0'4694 • .0.0'882 
01.8' -B • .0'3822 • .0'69114 -ll.B8214 .B.0'228 -B.B.0'335 -.0' • .0'748.0' 
011 -B • .0'2996 • .0'9393 -11 • .0'196.0' • .0'4348 -.0' . .0.0'.0'43 • 1.0'2 1.0' 
012 -B.11645 • .0'71711 -II .BB.0'75 • .0'.0'451 -.0' • .0'5631 .l.0'786 
013 -B • .0'4849 .11511 -l'.17371 -B • .0'7657 -.0' • .0'1474 -.0'.B.0996 
014 
-· • .0'6131 .24188 -II. 1.0'9.0'8 • .0'9714 -B • .0'2828 • .0'1785 
015 • .0'782.8' • .0'2261 -II • .0'5878 -B • .0'3895 -B . .0'3751 • .0'27.0'4 
016 • .8'7335 • .0'4682 .63156 -.0' • .0'1219 • .0'1898 • .0'2996 
017 .59.0'82 .Bl 6.0'1 • .0'7144 • .0'14.0'1 -B.B2119 • .0'.0'.0'74 
018 .12952 • 7 i 295 
-· • .0'5776 • .0'712.0' • .0'5799 • .0'4241 
019 -· • .0'5659 .45884 -11.15875 .13213 -.0'. l.0'522 • .0'9513 
02.9' -· • .8'6993 -·. 12383 -B • .0'1312 • .0'2479 • .0'1948 -.0' • .0'3366 021 -.8' • .0'6364 
-• • .8'7867 • .0'6668 • .0'1564 -.0' • .0'8176 • .0'5256 
022 -·. 16285 • .0'6211 -B.B2881 .19685 -B . .0'6874 • .0'2444 
023 -· • .0'6674 -.8'.B3BB1 .42549 -B.l.0'.0'51 -B.11481 • .0'328.0 
024 -· • .0'3862 -•.15943 • .0'8.0'65 -B.12578 -B • .0'8224 .l.0'762 
025 -·. l.0'133 • .0'9767 .35155 -.0' • .0'3664 -B . .0'4696 • 13.0'68 
026 -· • .0'3358 • .0'4469 .14975 -B • .0'4793 • .0'492.0' .flJ773.0' 027 • .0'91 18 
-· • .0'24311 • 44339 -B • .0'241.0' .B.0793 • 11232 028 .B5389 • .0'4158 • .0'4834 -B.B.0'894 • .0'4352 .68.0'34 
029 .24523 -• • .0'7.0'29 .1326.0' -B • .03536 .14262 .4235.0 
03.0' • .0'9316 
-·. 15344 .48549 -B • .0'.0745 • .0'5371 -B . .06732 031 -•.0'8281 • .0'4846 -B.289911 • .0'6849 • .0'6721 • .0'4635 
032 -·. 26628 -• • .0'5886 -B • .0'2.0'75 -.0' . .0'3337 • .0'3172 -B.BBB37 
Q33 -· • .0'3222 .1..0'265 -~ • .0'1445 • .0'5.0'74 -B . .0'2296 • 32468 034 .63512 .119547 • .0'6.0'38 -B . .0'1 766 -.0' • .0'6.0'9.0' .l.0'537 
035 .21179 .289B9 -II. 17719 .111391 -B • .0'16.43 -B:.0'3.426 
036 -· • .0'2624 · • .IJ59 l 5 -B.17972 -B • .0'19.0'7 .11649.0' -B • .0'4851 037 
.JJ3622 • .IJ1486 -B • .8'7928 • .86348 -B .114.0'1.0' -B • .0'1.0'98 
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Table 2 
continued 
FACTOR 
' 
FACTOR 7 FACTOR 8 FACTOR 9 FACTOR 18' FACTOR 11 
Q38 -•.1151118' -11.11119/IB .8'1272 • .0'17UJ -IL 16379 • .0'1672 
Q39 -B.B2Sllll -·. 1.Bl 1 7 .12138 • .0'6/1/iil • .0'9374 • .0'.0'1.06 
Q4B • 128-48 -ll.B/11142 • .9'9412 • .0'8397 .89717 .8287S 
au .1711.8'4 -11./17387 -ll • .9'4918 ./18898 .11962 -/l.1Sl77 
Q42 .JIS4S6 .1111117 -II. 1B67.4 .8339S .31278 -ll.81S88 
Q43 -B .BU/17 -B.B.0'4.41 -Jl./11S36 ./13S38 .817S8 -II. 1.0'388 
au • .0'591S -·. 17.497 ./ISB/17 • .0'3944 • .0'.0'931 -.0' • .0'S342 
Q4S .113263 -ll.3S315 ./IS768 • 1218.0' • l.0'683 • .0'6464 
Q46 -11.111367 ./14369 -II .B.0'682 -S'.117/182 -B .11.0'2.0' -B.3.0'914 
047 -ll.BB/138 ./12284 -11. l.0'496 -11./11668 • .0'.0'43.0' -ll • .0'5917 
Q48 -ll • .8'9684 -B./19996 -/I • .0'888'7 .22487 -.0' ./8363.0' • .0'5769 
Q49 .8'431/1 -ll.B22Bll -B • .81828' .63317 • .0'6376 -.0' • .0'2235 
CS/I • .8'9.0'35 .. 11. 13/161 ./118132 .7S.0'B8 .Bl.0'3.0' ./846/83 
QSl -ll.BB951 .8'4/169 -11./11162 -.0' • .0'1156 ./862.0'3 -ll.124SB 
Q52 -ll • .3SB32 • .112863 -II .llB/123 • .0'77S8 .0'6143 -.0' • .0'7495 
QS3 -11 • .116657 • .89623 -B • .83.882 • .81146 .SB19S ./874.0'1 
QS4 • .82573 ./19655 -11./16662 .18848 .1937S • .0'4291 
ass • .81959 -B. 214611 • /l.0'3.85 • .0'2615 .49593 • .0'199.0' 
QS6 .13242 -B.22797 .12876 • 11.0'77 .44267 • .0'4243 
QS7 .B3689 -11 • .11221111 .BlS39 • .0'.0'.0'33 .22361 -.0' • .0'1332 
ass .113299 -/l • .8'1696 • .8'7795 • 2S4.0'6 -.0' • .0'9215 • .0'11 S4 
C59 • .8'9138 -B • .8'4273 .13237 • .0'661.0' • .0'811 7 • .0'3672 Q6/I .1B948 • .8'1882 ./11635 .1/88711 • .0'1123 • .0'7972 
Q61 • .88116 -11.12737 .13379 -B • .0'1486 . .0'5926 .1S943 
Q62 
-• • .86137 -B. 1.0'214 .BS299 • .0'S898 -B . .0'.0'826 • .0'829S Q63 .173S2 
-· • .8'S244 .1488.8' -B • .0'5477 .85151 -.0'.81338 Q64 ./ISSB2 -B.JJ6S98 • .8'S782 .86212 .81432 -B.87978 
Q65 .111879 
-· • .8'43'9 -• • .198'96 . 12836 . .0'37.01 • .0'7562 Q66 • .1'66S"2 -11./14763 .136.82 -16. l.0'295 .11823 • .0'4679 Q67 • l 8S48 -11.2/1812 .1B493 • .0'6696 -18 . .0'3758 • .0'46.0'.0' Q68 
.BS893 • .0'2S 1.0' .12884 • .0'8624 -.0' . .0'.0'729 - B .. 0'7 1.0' 4 Q69 
-11./11827 .Bl 191 • .8'892/1 -.0' • .0'3331 . 1.0'8 4 6 • .0'6212 Q7.0' 
.1B23S -ll./172S3 • .0'4411 • .0'1331 -.0' . .0'2Sf.4 -.0' • .0'.0'664 Q71 
.B8924 .B14.0'8 ./13489 • .0'11877 -B • .0'2%9 -18 • .0'5324 Q72 
.113.8'SS -11. l.0'859 • 14984 • .0.0813 • .0'1785 • .0'45.0'7 Q73 • 1/1181 -Jl.JJ7538 ./1/1849 • .0'1417 .1887£4 -18.11356 
CH 
.15.0'4! -B./16284 .•6BSS • 121894 .14225 
.188897 
Q75 
.B.8'SS6 -11.118348 -• • .8'3544 
.8'33.0'8 .3.0'467 -11.111996 
£IGEN- 1 .116636 
¥AlUE l.35591 1. 22668 1.12579 1 .BB24 l 
.92546 
PCT OF l.9 1.7 l.i l.5 J.' 1.3 
VAil 
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that this factor represents a construct of tidiness in 
the work area and company. 
Factor 2, a physical stress factor, was defined by 
all the physical stress items (items 64,65,66,67,71, and 
72) except crowding and shiftwork. Item 73, warning 
signals not heard, which had been proposed as a physical 
hazard loaded on this factor also. This was probably due 
to its direct relationship to the physical stressor, 
noise. 
Factor 3, an anxiety factor, was composed of a 
majority of the anxiety items (items 36,37,38,39,40,41, 
and 42). Factor 4, the demographic factor, was composed 
of the three demographic items (items 1,3, and 4). 
Factor 5, a management control factor, was defined by 
several safety management items (items 7,9,13,20, and 22) 
and one locus of control item (item 26). This factor 
appears to represent a construct of "safety management in 
control of accidents." 
Factor 6, a danger level factor, was composed of 
three items (items 17,18, and 19) that determine the 
extent of injuries in the work area. Factor 8, also a 
danger level factor, was composed of two items (items 16, 
and 34) that determine whether or not danger exists at 
all. It appears that the danger level items form two 
constructs of danger that are divided according to level 
of danger they are measuring. 
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Factor 7 was composed of two safety management items 
(items 14, and 23), two locus of control items (items 27, 
and 30) and one anxiety item (item 45). This factor is 
basically uninterpretable. Factor 9 was defined by death 
of a relative, and death of a close friend which were 
both life stress items (items 49, and 50). 
Factor 10, shiftwork factor, was composed of one 
anxiety item (item 10), three life stress items (items 
53,55, and 56) and one physical stress item (item 75). 
All of these items concern shiftwork with its associated 
impact on stress and anxiety. 
Factor 11, a locus of control factor, was composed 
of three locus of control items (items 27,28, and 33) and 
one anxiety item (item 46). This factor represents 
beliefs about accident control and one anxiety item which 
correlates with locus of control. 
The response format was agree, do not know, and 
disagree throughout the survey with the exception of the 
physical hazard and stress checklists for which it was 
yes/no. Therefore, it is unlikely that the results of 
the factor analysis were due to any response variance 
error. However, the results could have been affected by 
contingency errors. Items forming an expected factor 
were often presented consecutively in the survey thus 
inflating the chances of finding these expected factors 
in the factor analysis. If this error was severe, 
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Table 3 
Reliability Analysis of Survey Factors 
Survey Factor Cronbach's Alpha #Items 
Safety Management .782 15 
Physical Hazards .746 9 
Danger Level .644 6 
Experience .694 3 
Physical Stress .694 8 
Anxiety .642 10 
Life Stress .504 11 
Locus of Control .335 7 
however, the expected factors would have been more 
strongly supported than they were. 
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The implications of these results for the proposed 
model are discussed in the following chapter. 
Reliability Analyses 
Reliability analyses of the eight scales in the 
survey basically produced the expected results {see Table 
3). Values of Cronbach's alpha ranged from .64-.78 for: 
safety management, physical hazards, danger level, 
experience, physical stressors, and anxiety. Two items 
were removed from the anxiety scale to increase alpha by 
.10. Item 44, "Most people are more afraid of the job 
hazards than I am," perhaps should have been stated as "I 
am more afraid of the job hazards than most people." In 
the original form, the determination of irrational fear 
{a symptom of anxiety.) which is the objective of this 
item is not accomplished. A person who is not anxious 
could disagree with this statement as easily as a highly 
anxious person. However, with the revised item, it is 
more likely that only the highly anxious respondents 
could agree. 
The second item removed from the anxiety scale to 
enhance reliability was item 47, "I am very sure of 
myself in new situations." It is likely that this item 
tapped a different personality characteristic, such as 
self-confidence rather than anxiety. While it is true 
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that anxious people may be very unsure of themselves in 
new situations, people who are not generally anxious 
could feel the same way. 
one item was eliminated from the locus of control 
scale to increase alpha by .10. Upon examination, it was 
discovered that the item, "I feel I have been lucky with 
regard to accidents," did not differentiate internal from 
external locus of control respondents very well. An 
internally oriented employee could agree with this 
statement as easily as an externally oriented one. Even 
with this correction, the locus of control scale obtained 
a low reliability as did the life stress scale. This 
problem is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
In summary, alpha values on the whole were adequate 
although they could have been better. Several items 
which were found to be flawed were eliminated. 
Correlations between Survey Variables 
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to 
obtain the interrelationships between all the survey 
variables (Table 4). The correlations were based on 
individual level data and were in logical directions. 
Safety management, danger level, physical hazards, 
physical stressors, anxiety, life stressors and locus of 
control were all significantly correlated with each other 
except locus of control was not correlated with life 
stress. A manufacturing plant with a good safety 
Table 4 
Correlation Matrix of the Survey Variables 
P E A R S 0 N C 0 R R E L A T I 0 N C 0 E F F I C I E N T S 
SAFETY 
ANXIETY 
DANGER 
LOCUS 
EXP3 
HAZLIST 
PSTRESS 
STRESSUW 
SAFETY 
1. Bf4Bf4 ( f4) 
P= • 
-f4.3455 
( 432) 
P= .BH8 
-8.3899 
( 432) 
P= .f4BB 
.33B.0 
( 432) 
p = • f4f4.0 
• .0.044 
( 4.06) 
P= .464 
-B. 6.044 
( 423) 
P= .BB.0 
-.0.551{4 
( 418) 
P= • .0.0.0 
-.0. 1665 
,. 43.0) 
P= .BBB 
ANXIETY 
-f4.3455 
( 432) 
P= • .0.0.0 
1 • Bf4Bf4 
( f4) 
P= 
.2434 
( 433) 
P= .f4.0f/J 
-B.2339 
( 433) 
p = • f4Bf4 
-JiJ • .0'46.0 
( 4f47 ) 
P= .177 
• 3674 
( 424) 
p = • .0.08 
.3989 
( 419> 
P= • .0£60 
.2494 
( 431 ) 
P= • .000 
DANGER. 
-{4.3899 
( 432) 
p = . HfiJ.0 
.2434 
( 433) 
p = . .0.0.0 
1 • EJ.0.0.0 ( .0) 
P= 
-JiJ.1193 
( 433) 
P= .JiJJiJ6 
• .0233 
( 4.07) 
P= • 32.0 
.4562 
( 424) 
P= .f4JiJJiJ 
• 43.07 
( 419) 
p = . fi1f4fi1 
• 1364 ( 431) 
p = . .0'.02 
LOCUS 
• 33JiJ.0 
( 432) 
P= .JiJJiJ.0 
-liJ.2339 
( 433) 
P= .HJUI 
-.0.1193 
( 433) 
p = • .0.06 
1 • JiJJiJJiJJiJ ( JiJ) 
P= 
.8'368 
( 48'7) 
P= .23f4 
-.lL1817 
( 424) 
p = • fiJ.0{4 
-{4. 1663 
( 419) 
p = • f6fiJf4 
-JiJ .f4B74 
( 431) 
P= .44JiJ 
EXP3 
• B'JiJ4 4 
( 4JiJ6) 
P= .464 
-liJ .JiJ46/iJ 
( 4flJ7 ) 
P= .177 
.JiJ233 
( 4JiJ7) 
P= • 32JiJ 
.JiJ368 
( 4JiJ7) 
P= • 23JiJ 
1 • fiJf4fiJfiJ 
( flJ) 
P= 
• .0145 
( 4/iJl ) 
P= • 386 
-liJ • .0253 
( 396) 
p.. • 3{48 
-.0.1127 
( 4flJ5 ) 
P= • .012 
HAZLIST 
-liJ .6JiJ44 
( 423) 
P= .JiJ.0JiJ 
.3674 
( 424) 
p = • JiJ.0.0 
.4562 
( 424) 
p = • .0.0JiJ 
-JiJ.1817 
( 424) 
P= .JiJliJJiJ 
• JiJl 45 
( 4.01) 
P= .386 
1 • .0JiJJiJJiJ 
( liJ) 
P= 
.659.0 
( 417) 
p = • f4fiJli1 
.2395 
( 422) 
P= • liJJiJf4 
PSTRESS 
-liJ. 55 lfiJ 
( 418) 
p.. • .0/iJ.0 
.3989 
( 419) 
P= .liJJiJJiJ 
.43JiJ7 
( 419) 
P= .8/iJ.0 
-liJ.1663 
( 419) 
p = . liJJiJJiJ 
-.0.JiJ253 
( 396) 
P= • 3JiJ8 
.659.0 
( 417> 
P= • .0JiJJiJ 
1 • JiJJiJJiJ.0 ( JiJ) 
P= 
.2459 
( 418) 
P= .JiJJiJJiJ 
STRESSUW 
-JiJ.1665 
( 4 3JiJ) 
p = . JiJ.0.0 
.2494 
( 431) 
p = . JiJJiJJiJ 
.1364 
( 431) 
P= .liJJJ2 
-fiJ.fiJf474 
( 4 31 ) 
P= • 44f4 
-JiJ.1127 
( 4.0 5 ) 
P= • .012 
.2395 
( 422) 
P= .JiJJiJJiJ 
.2459 
( 418) 
p ... JiJJiJJiJ 
1 • JiJJiJJiJJiJ ( JiJ) 
P= 
(COEFFICIENT I <CASES1 I 1-TAILED SIG> • IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED 
EXP3•experience HAZLIST•physical hazard• PSTRESS•phyaical atreaa 
STRESSUW•life stress 
so 
program, according to these results, would also likely 
have low levels of danger, physical hazards, physical 
stressors, anxiety, life stress and an internal locus of 
control bias. 
Age and experience were significantly correlated 
with life stress. The more experienced employees 
reported less life stress, perhaps since the commonly 
cited stressors included new job assignments, new work 
schedules, and less job security. 
Correlations of Survey Variables with Accidents 
A matrix of Pearson product-moment correlations was 
computed to obtain the relationships between the survey 
variables with the dependent measures of accident rate. 
The correlations were based on group level data and the 
obtained correlations were those predicted by the 
proposed model (see Table 5). The log transformation of 
accident rates greatly enhanced the obtained 
correlations. Without the transformation, only four 
significant correlations were found. In subsequent 
analysis, therefore, the log of accident rates was used 
as the the dependent measure. 
Safety management, danger level, physical stress, 
experience, and locus of control were all significantly 
correlated with the log of accident rates for 1985 and 
1984 combined. Accident rates were lower for plants with 
good safety management, lower levels of danger and 
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Table 5 
Correlation Matrix of Survey Variables with Accident Rates 
AR85 POOL AR LAR LPOOLAR 
SAFETY -8.1242 -iJ.1298 -8. 239.0' -.0'.21.0'8 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= .138 P= .127 P= • .0'17 P= . .0'31 
DANGER .. .0'913 .22.0'8 .2293 .2855 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= .212 p .. . .0'25 P= .821 P= • .0'.0'5 
ANXIETY .1836 . .0'317 .2481 . .0'991 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= • .0'53 P= .391 P= • .0' 14 P= .192 
EXP3 -.0'. 1.0'82 -.0'. 1.0'9 l -8.1984 -.0'.1936 
( 78) ( 78i ( 78} { 78/ 
P= .173 P= . 1 71 P= .841 P= .i/45 
PHAZ • .0'381 -B.if.0'7.0' .1245 ./4295 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= .37B P= .475 P= .137 P= .398 
PSTRESS . 1825 . 11148 . 3271 .2161 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= • .0'54 P= .165 P= • iJ.0'2 P= . .0'28 
UWSTRESS . .0'653 -8.8898 • .0'562 . .0'992 
( 79) ( 79) ( 79) ( 79) 
P= .284 P= .469 P= • 311 P= .192 
LOCUS -8./!927 -.0'. 2458 -.0'.1794 ' -.0'.2642 
( 79) ( 79> ( 79) ( 79) 
P= • 2.0'8 P• • .0'15 P= . .0'57 p .. .8.0'9 
<COEFFICIENT I <CASES> I 1-TAILED SIG> 
EXP3•experience PHAZ•physical hazards 
PSTRESS•physical stress UWSTRESS•life stress 
ARSS•accident rates for 1985 
POOLAR•accident rates for 1984 and 1985 
LAR•log of accident rates for 1985 
LPOOLAR•log of accident rates for 1985 and 1985 
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physical stress. Accident rates were also lower for more 
experienced workers and for internal locus of control 
individuals. 
The use of the log of accident rates for 1985 only 
yielded the same results with one additional finding. 
Anxiety was significantly correlated with 1985 accidents, 
where less anxious departments had fewer accidents. A 
recency effect appeared to be occurring in which anxiety 
predicted accidents that were close in time to the 
reports of the anxiety. The 1984-1985 pooled data was 
likely to be more reliable with respect to the remainder 
of the proposed model, thus the log of 1984-1985 accident 
rates was retained for use as a dependent measure. 
Subunit Size 
Work group size was correlated with the four 
measures of accident rate. A significant positive 
correlation (_r-:.21, R<.04, n=79) was found only between 
size of the work group and log of accident rate for 1985. 
There was no correlation between the log of the pooled 
1984-1985 accident rates and work group size. This lack 
of correlation could be attributed to fluctuations in 
group size from. 1984 to 1985; only sizes for 1985 could 
be obtained for the analysis. 
Both linear and curvilinear model components were 
tested in the regression analysis. Size and size-squared 
were regressed upon log of accident rate of 1985. The 
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linear effect accounted for 4.1% of the explained 
variance in the dependent variable (R<.073) , which 
increased to 8.6% when the quadratic was added (R<.033). 
Results supported a curvilinear hypothesis. 
A scattergram revealed a break-point relationship 
which integrated the findings of a linear and a 
curvilinear relationship. Size and accidents were 
positively correlated in a linear fashion until a 
breakpoint at about 15 people where only large accident 
rates occurred. The distribution for small groups 
appeared to be bimodal, with a lower mode at accident 
rate=O.OO, and an upper mode at accident rate=0.90-2.23. 
When size became greater than 15 people, the distribution 
at accident rate=0.00 disappeared and only the higher 
accident rate distribution remained. 
Path Analysis 
A path analysis consisting basically of two multiple 
regressions was conducted to test the model. The forced 
entry method of multiple regression was used since this 
is the appropriate method for testing models (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1975). The first multiple regression used 
accident rate as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables which were proposed to relate directly to 
accident rate were entered at the group level in the 
following order: safety management, danger level, 
experience, anxiety, and physical hazards. When 
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regressed upon the log of accident rates for 1985 only, 
the variables were found to account for 15.7% of the 
variance which was significant at the R<.05 level (see 
Table 6). When the variables were regressed upon the log 
of accident rates for 1984 and 1985 combined, the 
variance accounted for was 15.3% which was significant at 
the R<.005 level (see Table 7). 
The second regression in the path analysis used 
anxiety as the dependent variable with independent 
variables at the individual level entered in this order: 
physical stress, life stress, and locus of control. The 
independent variables accounted for 21.4% of the variance 
in anxiety, and this was significant at the R<.001 level 
(Table 8). 
Overall Regression 
The overall regresssion revealed a direct path from 
physical stress to accident rates that was not included 
in the original model. When physical stress was entered 
into the regression of safety management, physical 
hazards, anxiety, experience, and danger level, the 
explained variance of accident rate increased from 15.7% 
to 20.6% when accident rate for 1985 only was the 
dependent variable (see Table 6). When physical stress 
was entered into the regression of the variables proposed 
to directly relate to accident rate for 1984 and 1985 
combined, the explained variance increased from 15.3% to 
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Table 6 
Path Analysis and Overall Regression Using 1985 Accident Rates 
direct 
relationshiJ2 
Variable F(model) t(last step) R R2 Adjusted R2 
Safety Management ... 655 .239 .057 .045 
Danger Level 1.625 .275 .075 .058 
Experience -1.285 .337 .113 .078 
Anxiety 1.001 .370 .136 .090 
Physical Hazards 2.695* -2.054 .397 .157 .099 
direct and indirect 
relationshiE 
Physical Stress 2.005 .454 .206 .139 
indirect 
relationshi;e 
Life Stress .078 .454 .206 .127 
Locus of Control 2.241* .093 .454 .206 .114 
p*<.05 
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Table 7 
Path Analysis and overall Regression Using 1984 and 1985 
Accident Rates 
direct 
relationshie 
Variable F(model) t(last stee> ~ R2 Adjusted R2 
Safety Management -1.195 .211 .045 .032 
Danger Level 3.031 .300 .090 •. 066 
Experience -1.237 .358 .128 .093 
Anxiety -0.049 .358 .120 .DBl 
Physical Hazards 3.787 ** -2.964 .456 .208 .153 
indirect and direct 
relationshie 
Physical Stress l.270 .485 .235 .l 71 
indirect 
relationshiI? 
Life Stress l.178 .501 .251 .l 76 
Locus of Control 2.956* -0.646 .sos .255 .169 
p*fl<.005 
p-ac::. 01 
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Table 8 
Path Analysis with Anxiety as Dependent Variable 
Variable F(model) t(last step) R 
Physical Stress 7.193 .399 
Life Stress 3.722 .428 
Locus of Control 37.632*** -4.030 .463 
***<.001 p . 
.160 
.183 
.214 
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23.5% (see Table 7). It appears that the model was 
correct in that it proposed physical stress to affect 
accident rate through its effect on anxiety but lacking 
in that it proposed no direct effect. 
Life stress and locus of control affected accidents 
only indirectly. When they were directly regressed upon 
accident rate for 1985, they did not account for any 
additional explained variance. When they were directly 
regressed upon accident rate 1984 and 1985, it appeared 
that they accounted for an additional 2% variance. 
However, the adjusted R coefficients (Table 7) indicated 
that the increase in variance accounted for was due to 
the increase in number of predictors. 
In summary, the path analysis fully supported the 
model and the overall regression supported the addition 
of one more path (see Figures 2 and 3). A slight 
revision of the model was in order. It was necessary to 
add the direct path from physical stress to accident rate 
to the model. 
Cross-validation 
The path analysis was cross-validated in two ways. 
In the first cross-validation, subsamples consisted of 
randomly selected companies. In the second 
cross-validation, subsamples consisted of randomly 
selected work groups. The company cross-validation was 
conducted by dividing the sample into two parts, one 
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Figure !• Results of the path analysis using 1985 accident rates. 
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Figure 1· Results of the path analysis using 1984-1985 accident rates. 
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consisting of six companies and the other of three 
companies. Companies were left intact in order to test 
the generalizability of the model from one company to the 
next. Cross-validations were conducted using both the 
five variable and the six variable models of factors 
directly related to accident rate. Weights obtained from 
repeating all regression analyses on the larger part of 
the sample resulted in the following equations for the 
five variable model: 
(1) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.006637*Safety 
Management)+(0.026993*Danger Level)-(0.065958* 
Experience)+(0.060672*Anxiety)-(0.008451* 
Physical Hazards)+l.203895 
(2) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.0453830* 
Safety Management)+(0.13476l*Danger Level) 
-(0.030593*Experience)+(0.023712*Anxiety) 
-(0.17.1868*Physical Hazard)+l.848447. 
The following equations resulted for the six 
variable model: 
(3) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.001390*Safety 
Management)+(0.024425*Danger Level)-(0.052176* 
Experience)+(0.037657*Anxiety)-(0.066831* 
Physical Hazard)+(0.138322*Physical 
Stress)+0.819017. 
(4) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.040627* 
Safety Management)+(0.132442*Danger Level) 
-(0.018152*Experience)+(0.002935*Anxiety)-
(0.224570*Physical Hazard+(0.124870* 
Physical Stress)+l.501000. 
The following equation resulted for anxiety: 
(5) Anxiety=(0.613209*Physical Stress)+(0.197050* 
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Life Stress)-(0.285310*Locus of Control)+5.150613. 
Each of these equations held up under 
cross-validation (see Table 9). Even under 
cross-validation, the six variable model was better than 
the five variable model originally proposed. For the six 
variable model, R increased from .454 to .468 using log 
accident rate of 1985 as the dependent measure, and from 
.485 to .577 using log accident rate of 1984-1985. The 
five variable model was not as predictive, although still 
significant. The coefficient of multiple correlation for 
log accident rate 1985 decreased slightly from .397 to 
.392, but increased for log accident rate 1984-1985 from 
.456 to .551. The cross-validations demonstrated that 
the equations as predicted by the theoretical model were 
stable across samples of organizations. An increase in ~ 
upon cross-validation is not a usual occurrence. In this 
particular sample, each company was likely to have 
contributed situational variability to the relationship 
between survey variables and accident rates. This 
variability was probably reduced when the sample was 
divided into two parts for the cross-validation. 
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Table 9 
Cross-valid~tions of the Path Analysis 
Sample divided into two subsamples of intact companies. 
Dependent Variable•l985 Accident !.!.!!.! 
R R r 
Equation ~ .!'.!!!!. Sample Validation Sample cross-validation 
(1) var~able * .397 .311 .392 
(3) var~able ** .454 .364 .468 
Dependent Variable•,!lli .!!!£ ~ Accident ~ 
5 *** ( 2) variable .456 .427 .551 
(4) 6 *** variable .485 .471 .577 
Sample divided into-two subsamples of work groups. 
Dependent Variable·~ Accident ~ 
5 
Cl) variable .397 .482 .064 
6 (3) variable .512 .205 .205 
De];!endent Variable•.ll!!i ~ ~ Accident !..!!.!.! 
5 (2) variable .456 .510 .218 
6 (4) variable .485 .536 .219 
Sample divided into two subsamples of individuals. 
Dependen.t Variable•Anxiety 
3 
variable .463 .472 (5) **** .426 
* p <.os 
**< p .01 
***< p .oos 
**** p <·OOl 
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To investigate this explanation, another 
cross-validation was performed. This time individual 
work groups rather than intact companies were randomly 
selected and assigned to one of the two subsamples. The 
work group cross-validation consisted of dividing the 
sample into a subsample of 26 groups and a subsample of 
53 groups. cross-validations were conducted using both 
the five variable and the six variable models of factors 
directly related to accident rate. Weights obtained from 
repeating all regression analyses on the larger part of 
the sample resulted in the following equations for the 
five varible model: 
(1) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.052489*Safety 
Management)+(0.113233*Danger Level)-(0.045814* 
Experience)+(0.036927*Anxiety) 
-(0.124982*Physical Hazards)+l.203895 
(2) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.074356*Safety 
Management)+(0.13476l*Danger Level)-(0.031400* 
Experience)+(0.005215*Anxiety) 
-(0.162788*Physical Hazards)+2.61244. 
The following equations resulted for the six 
variable model: 
(3) Log Accident Rate for 1985=(-0.036950*Safety 
Management)+(0.095552*Danger Level)-(0.043801* 
Experience)+(0.020362*Anxiety)-(0.161289* 
Physical Hazards)+(0.144439*Physical 
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Stress)+l.249063 
(4) Log Accident Rate for 1984-1985=(-0.06186*Safety 
Managemerit)+(0.085540*Danger Level)-(0.029777* 
Experience)+(O.Ol8572*Anxiety)-(0.192065* 
Physical Hazards)+(0.111647*Physical 
Stress)+2.208386. 
These equations did not hold up under 
cross-validation (see Table 9) • 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
This final chapter begins with a discussion of the 
important findings in this study with emphasis on the 
theoretical relevance, A section on the limitations of 
the study including reliability, and internal and 
external validity follows. The chapter and dissertation 
ends with sections on the practical implications of the 
study and plans for future research. 
Important Findings and Their Theoretical 
Relevance 
Correlations. The variables in the model were found 
to be significantly intercorrelated in the directions 
that the model predicted. Plants which reported poorer 
safety management programs also reported higher levels of 
danger, physical hazards, physical stressors, and higher 
levels of anxiety, life stress and an external locus of 
control bias. The more experienced workers reported less 
life stress to a significant degree probably due to less 
reports of the common stressors such as new job 
assignments, new work schedules, and less job security. 
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Anxiety was found to correlate with life stress and locus 
of control but life stress and locus of control did not 
correlate with each other. 
It is understandable that physical hazards, physical 
stressors, danger level, and safety management, were all 
interrelated because they were environmental 
characteristics of the same work place. Also, all were 
hypothesized to affect accident rates directly. It 
follows that anxiety, which was partially attributable to 
physical stressors and related directly to accident rate, 
was correlated with all the variables with which physical 
stress was correlated. According to the hypotheses, life 
stress and external locus of control orientation should 
lead to anxiety, and so it is appropriate that these two 
variables were significantly correlated with all the 
variables with which anxiety was correlated. Life stress 
and locus of control, however, were thought to be 
independent of each other. Thus, the lack of correlation 
between them was consistent with the model. 
Secondly, the variables in the model were also 
significantly correlated with the dependent variables, 
log of accident rates for 1985 and log of accident rates 
for 1984-1985. Safety management, danger level, physical 
stress, experience, locus of control, and anxiety were 
all correlated with accident rates. Plants which 
reported poorer safety management, higher danger level, 
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high physical stress, less job experience, or an external 
locus of control bias had higher accident rates. The 
anxiety correlation was found only for 1985 accident 
rates. It appears that anxiety can predict accidents 
only if accidents and anxiety are measured at proximal 
times. This finding is logical since anxiety is often a 
temporary condition rather than a stable trait. Life 
stress which was found to be a predictor of anxiety was 
measured in the most recent 6 months, so it is logical 
that anxiety resulting from life stress would only be 
related to accidents during the same limited time period. 
The results of the correlations between survey 
variables and accident rates basically supported the 
hypotheses. One exception was that physical hazards were 
not found to correlate with accidents. Further 
discussion of this finding can be found under 
limitations. 
Regressions. It was previously mentioned that one 
objective of this research was to expand the present 
theory about accidents. The organizational climate 
literature has focused on safety management issues. This 
study demonstrated that although safety management is a 
significant variable in accidents, other variables should 
also be included. 
There is already adequate support for the predictive 
validity that experience, danger level, and physical 
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hazards contribute to any model of accidents. This study 
corroborated these findings. Previous research supported 
the hypothesis that anxiety directly affects accident 
rate but studies were post-dictive in nature. This study 
supplied concurrent validity for the anxiety-accident 
relationship. 
The path analysis conducted on the proposed model 
produced results that strongly supported the model. 
Safety management, danger level, physical hazards, 
experience, and anxiety accounted for a significant 
proportion of the accident rate variance. 
Previous research also supported the stress, locus 
of control, and anxiety relationship. High stress 
directly increases anxiety, and locus of control 
moderates this effect with internals being less anxious. 
This study measured these variables in an industrial 
setting along with the more "typical accident" variables 
of safety management, physical hazards, danger level, and 
experience. Physical stress, life stress, and locus of · 
control were found to be significant predictors of 
anxiety as previous research suggested. Locus of control 
and life stress affected accidents through anxiety only. 
Physical stress, however, had an indirect as well as a 
direct effect on accidents. 
Upon conducting an overall regression on the 
variables in the model, a finding not previously included 
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in the model was discovered. Physical stress correlated 
with accidents indirectly through anxiety as proposed, 
but also correlated directly with accidents, which was 
not originally proposed. When the model was revised to 
include the new finding, proportion of criterion variance 
accounted for was increased 3-5%. Upon examination, this 
finding is quite logical. Physical stress not only 
causes error by causing more anxiety but physical stress 
itself can cause error. For example, noise which is a 
physic~! stressor can increase anxiety thus increasing 
chance for error. Noise can also mask a warning signal 
thereby causing a person to miss the chance to avoid the 
hazard because the person does not even realize the 
hazard exists. 
Uncontrollable physical stress and its effect on 
error has been explained in various ways. According to 
adaptive-cost hypothesis, stress drains a person's energy 
due to the extra effort required to maintain the same 
performance level. It takes more energy to do the same 
job in extreme heat so a person becomes tired, makes an 
error, and an accident results. According to information 
overload hypothesis, dealing with stress saps channel 
capacity. Since safety is often given secondary task 
status, errors of that type become more likely. 
Actually, the two hypotheses are quite similar. 
Learned helplessness theory predicts that 
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individuals lose the motivation to lessen the physical 
stress they are experiencing because past experience has 
demonstrated ·their actions to be futile. This lack of 
motivation extends to both the primary and secondary 
tasks, and inevitably an accident results. The theories 
were not tested in this study but are included merely to 
provide a rationale for the physical stress-accident 
finding. The theory supported by this study is that 
uncontrollable stressors in occupational settings affect 
accidents directly by creating a hazardous environment 
and/or affect accidents indirectly by increasing anxiety 
which leads to error. 
The model held up strongly under cross-validation 
when the sample was divided into two subsamples of intact 
companies. Cross-validation coefficients actually 
increased rather than decreasing as they typically do in 
cross-validations studies as a result of the decrease in 
sample size necessary to conduct the analysis. This 
study was unique, however, in the sense that results in 
the path analysis were based on collapsing data across 
nine distinct companies with.their particular 
characteristics. Therefore, when the sample was divided 
for the cross-validation, the randomizing effects of 
these characteristics probably decreased and Bs 
increased. 
Evidence for this was provided by, the second 
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cross-validation in which the sample was divided into two 
subsamples of individual work groups rather than intact 
companies. In this situation, cross-validation did not 
hold up as it did for randomly selected companies. 
Subunit Size. Analyses of subunit size added to the 
theoretical debate over its relationship to accidents. 
Smaller groups were found to have less accidents than 
larger groups on the whole. small groups, less than 15 
members, were bimodally distributed with one group at o.o 
accident rate and the other in a higher accidPnt range. 
At the point where number of members is greater than 15, 
this o.o mode disappeared and only the higher accident 
rate mode remained. This helped to explain the previous 
research findings of both a positively correlated linear 
relationship and a curvilinear relationship between size 
and accidents. 
Limitations of the Study 
Reliability. The reliability analysis of the eight 
scales contained in the survey produced adequate results. 
Cronbach's alphas were in the .64-.78 range for safety 
management, physical hazards, danger level, experience, 
physical stressors, and anxiety. The alpha obtained for 
locus of control was lower than expected (.34). Alpha 
for life stress was lower than expected (.50). One item 
was removed from the anxiety and two from the locus of 
control scales. These items were not found to 
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discriminate as they should have. 
The lower reliability of the locus of control scale 
was believed to be partially due to the nature of the 
sample. Volunteer industrial subjects have been found to 
have a more internal locus of control than university 
students on whom research on the scale is based (Sims et 
al., 1984). The manufacturing sample used in this study 
was compared to the student sample used in pilot work. 
The university students obtained a mean of 8.2 (s=3.63) 
on the locus of control scale while the manufacturing 
sample obtained a significantly higher mean of a.a 
(s=2.59, t=-2.37, R<.05). 
Internally oriented employees could have 
participated in the survey because they believed that 
through their participation they would have an impact on 
the work environment.. Perhaps internal locus of control 
individuals simply were not afraid to participate and 
external locus of control individuals were. Internal 
locus of control workers would be more likely to feel 
that the consequences of their participation were in 
their control. Whatever the reason for the internal 
locus of control bias, it is apparent that the bias could 
have severely restricted the range of responses to the 
locus of control items. This restriction in range could 
be a contributor to the unreliability of the scale. The 
bias also may have attenuated the anxiety and locus of 
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control effects due to restricted range. 
on the life stress scale, several of the items, such 
as death of a spouse, death of a friend, and new job 
assignments, were rarely reported. The restriction in 
range of responses for these items could be responsible 
for the lower reliability of the scale. 
The implications of the low reliabilities of the 
anxiety, life stress, and locus of control scales are 
obvious. Decreased reliability leads to decreased 
construct validity. The impact of these variables on 
each other and on accident rates is likely to have been 
underestimated in this study. 
Internal Validity. The scales for experience, 
physical stress, and anxiety factored as expected. The 
danger level scale formed two scales. The first scale 
was comprised of items that established whether any 
hazard existed. The second scale was comprised of items 
that assessed the higher levels of danger. It is 
apparent that there may be a problem with the construct 
validity of the other factors. Only three locus of 
control items loaded on the locus of control scale. 
Safety management items were divided into two constructs; 
one was management in control factor and the other 
combined with physical hazard items as a messiness 
factor. There appeared to be a shiftwork construct 
consisting of life stress items with shiftwork. No life 
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stress factor was extracted. 
The low correlation of the locus of control scale 
used in the study and Rotter's locus of control scale 
suggests that the locus of control construct used in the 
survey should be renamed to belief about accident 
control. The low correlation, although significant, also 
indicates that belief about accident control is 
independent of Rotter's scale. However, the same 
hypotheses are made about the relationship of belief 
about accident control to accidents as those made for 
locus of control. 
It appears that there is more than one way for the 
various items in the survey to combine. In a survey it 
is easy to propose distinct factors. In an applied 
environment, however, items from various sources blend 
together in some cases to form an unexpected factor. In 
this study, for example, physical hazards items blended 
with safety management items to form a messiness factor. 
It appears that the fundamentals of the proposed model 
are accurate, but the model may be more complicated than 
originally proposed. 
If the problems with the construct in the survey are 
not eliminated, the internal validity of the study is in 
question. One cannot be confident that the obtained 
results truly support the proposed model since 
measurement of the independent variables may have been 
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flawed. 
External Validity. As previously mentioned, there 
may be a response bias present in the study. The sample 
on the average had a high internal locus of control 
-
score, indicating respondents tended to be more 
internally oriented than non-respondents. It is 
possible, therefore, that the results obtained from this 
sample are applicable only for individuals with an 
internal locus of control {a belief that they can control 
accidents) • The data for non-respondent!l;l'. could change "· 
the obtained results dramatically if it were in fact true 
that the survey constructs interrelated differently for 
an external belief sample. One solution for this problem 
would be to make participation in the survey mandatory as 
a safety precaution. 
It was mentioned that physical hazards did not 
correlate with accidents as expected. This could be due 
to 23% of respondents answering that no hazards existed 
in their work environment. The skewed distribution could 
be responsible for lowered correlations between the 
hazard checklist and accidents. Also, the fact that 
there was a very high negative correlation between safety 
and physical hazards suggests that· a good safety program 
may limit the number of accidents due to physical 
hazards. 
In both of these cases, the external validity of the 
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study is threatened. In the first case, a response bias 
may invalidate the use of survey variables to predict 
accident rates. Since accident rates were based on the 
entire sample, any measures used to predict accident 
rates should be representitive of the entire sample. The 
potential response bias indicates that the data obtained 
from the survey may not have been truly representitive of 
the sample. In the second case, the lack of correlation 
between physical hazard and accidents may have resulted 
from the skewed distribution of the hazard checklist. 
Multiple regression requires that independent variables 
be normally distributed so this violation may have 
resulted in an underestimate of the true contribution of 
physical hazards to accidents. 
Although the regression models were supported by the 
cross-validation at the company level, cross-validation 
at the work group level was not supported thus limiting 
the external validity of the path model. The regression 
models can be generalized to new companies with 
confidence, but, generalization to specific work groups 
outside the validation sample should be attempted with 
caution. 
Practical Implications 
The data obtained from this survey can be used to 
build a causal model of human error related accidents 
that can be applied to occupational settings. All the 
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survey variables can be measured and used to pinpoint 
problem areas in a particular company. For example, if 
poor safety management is found to be responsible for a 
large percentage of variance in accident rate for a 
particular foundry, a program for improved safety 
management can be introduced. or, if life stress is 
found to be a particular problem in a company, a 
counseling program could be installed. Solutions could 
be at the individual or organizational level depending on 
the problem and so the appropriate type of consultant 
should be contacted (i.e., clinical or organizational). 
Future Research 
Accident rates for the work groups in the sample 
will be collected for October 1985-0ctober 1986. The 
analyses conducted with the dependent variables in this 
study will then be repeated using these rates as the 
dependent variable so that predictive validity in 
addition to concurrent validity can be established. 
The nonlinear relationship found between 
organizational subunit size and accident rates is worthy 
of further investigation. Future research plans include 
analysis of the interdependencies among task type, 
organization, survey variables and subunit size. This 
analysis would hopefully explain the origins of the 
nonlinear relationship. 
Another future research objective is to revise the 
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survey. The life stress and locus of control scales can 
be improved as already mentioned. The life stress scale 
will be revised to include more commonly occurring items. 
Instead of death of a spouse, or death of a friend which 
received few positive responses, other items from the 
Ruch and Holmes (1971) stress scale will be included 
(e.g., mortgage over $10,000; minor violations of the law 
will be represented by the statement "I usually drive 
5-10 miles over the speed limit"). 
Three things will be done to improve the locus of 
control scale, which will be renamed belief about 
accident control. First, more items will be pilot tested 
with an industrial sample rather than a student sample as 
used for the pilot test of this study. The purpose of 
the pilot test will be to find more items that 
significantly correlate with Rotter's (1966) scale. 
Secondly, a forced choice format will be developed 
similar to Rotter's method. Hopefully, this will improve 
the reliability of the scale. The forced choice response 
mode was avoided in this study due to its potential for 
complicating the survey and confusing respondents. 
Lastly, an incentive system for persuading individuals 
with an external belief orientation to respond to the 
survey will be developed. If these individuals 
participate in the study, the belief scale will be 
improved, and the response bias along with its negative 
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implications for validity will be eliminated. 
The physical hazard checklist did not correlate with 
the dependent variables as it was expected to. As 
mentioned, 24% of reports were that no hazards from the 
checklist existed. If the hazard checklist was compared 
across several industries including more hazardous 
environments such as mining, the chance of finding a 
correlation would be improved. 
The factor analysis extracted some unexpected 
factors of shiftwork, safety management control of 
accidents, and a messiness factor. In this one study, it 
is difficult to determine whether these factors were a 
function of the metal industry studied or were enduring 
constructs of the survey. To further investigate the 
model, another future plan involving this research is to 
conduct the revised survey across several industries such 
as mining, chemical, and agricultural. Results of this 
extended analyses will uncover useful information about 
the appropriate factor structure, as it is now unknown 
whether the new factors obtained in this study should be 
ignored, used in substitution of factors originally 
proposed, or used in combination with the original 
factors. If the results of the factor analysis obtained 
in this study receive further support, future research 
plans will include building a model based on these 
factors. 
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In the very long run, the model can be extended and 
research conducted on accidents other than occupational 
types. Automobile accidents, a definite problem in the 
United States, could possibly be decreased due to 
knowledge gained by applying this model. 
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